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Introduction
In what follows I would like to recommend the creation of a new under-
graduate course, or, rather, a brand new academic program, with all its MAs, 
BAs, and PhD programs, dean and faculty, freshmen and freshwomen, ap-
plications, debates on newspapers, government commissions, areas of study, 
Erasmus programs, faculty’s impact factor, and so on. The name of such a 
new academic program, or undergraduate course, would be “science of re-
cording” and it would be designed to address the new needs of our society, 
which, in entering the new century, has to face the challenge of a world that 
was mistakenly thought to be dominated by communication (and, unfor-
tunately, by all sorts of wannabe orators) and that unexpectedly discovers 
itself as being dominated by recording.
Don’t worry, I am just kidding. I have no such intention. My aim is just 
to illustrate the signiﬁcance of writing and recording in our world, and to 
point out that such a signiﬁcance has been sometimes overlooked, causing 
perspectival mistakes that, at least in my opinion, should be corrected, and 
there is no better occasion to start doing it than at a conference on the “Phi-
losophy of the Information Society”. No doubt that our society, and almost 
certainly every conceivable society, is a society of information: one cannot 
live without knowing; not even Robinson can do it. A fortiori  in a complex 
society, one cannot live without knowing. 
It is often thought that that means that we live in a society of communi-
cation, both in the sense that communication is necessary for society and 
in the sense of an unprecedented expansion of communication in our time. 
I doubt both such contentions. Of course, a society must communicate in 
order to exist; but communication alone doesn’t sufﬁce. Indeed it seems a 
function that is subordinated to something more essential, namely recording. 
The idea I would like to sketch here is that we live in a society of recording 
and that this is the possibility condition of a society of communication, and, 
of course, of information. By saying that we are in a society of recording I 
just mean that if we look to all the transformations that have characterized 
our time we ﬁnd that they have mainly happened in the realm of recording 
and not in that of communication. 
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Ontology of actuality
Let us begin by considering actuality. The 20th January 2008 the New 
York Times published an article on the new Japanese teen trend to read nov-
els (written and distributed) on cell phones. One would make a mistake in 
deeming such a story as just another oriental weirdness, just like the story 
according to which Japanese people sleep in cylinders. No doubt it’s a weird 
story, however such weirdness has nothing to do with the Far East, but has to 
do with all of us. This is because this story plainly contradicts a conviction 
that is typical of our time—young people don’t read books, they just watch 
TV—and seems to deny the alleged primary function of phones, namely 
their being instruments designed for speaking, not for reading novels. 
Let us turn the page, so to say, but let us keep our eye on the New York 
Times. There have been a lot of discussions some months ago about the an-
nounced disappearance in 2013 of the paper edition of the New York Times. 
However, such piece of news, though having a symbolic signiﬁcance, is 
not so surprising. Indeed, while the New York Times announces the end of 
its paper edition, entire forests are destroyed to produce the paper on which 
countless free publications are printed, and which owe their existence to 
computers. Isn’t it curious? We can dispense with paper thanks to comput-
ers, but will the function “print” be ever removed from word processors?  
It will never be removed—I bet—at least if we consider the moral of 
a further story that appeared on newspapers: the IATA (International Air 
Transport Association) has placed its last order of paper tickets. From 2008, 
there will be no more paper tickets, only codes. Really? I don’t think so. The 
right thing to say is that there will be codes that will be written on post-its, 
or printed on paper in ofﬁce, just like we already do with our e-tickets for 
trains and planes. When there will be no ofﬁcial paper tickets, there will be 
a ﬂourishing of homemade tickets, and the obvious reason for this is that 
it’s hard to remember all those codes and one cannot simply open her or his 
laptop at the check-in desk to retrieve the code—for this would predictably 
irritate the people waiting in line. What we are confronted with is a proc-
ess that is somewhat paradoxical: the disappearance (in principle) of paper 
caused by the fact that it is possible to write “without paper” amounts to an 
unprecedented, in human history, invasion of paper. 
These are only three among numerous pieces of news whose subject is 
writing. These stories—that grab our attention more and more—often have 
the typical form of prophecies that haven’t been fulﬁlled or that of prophe-
cies that have been fulﬁlled, but in the opposite way. Their characteristic 
mark is always the same: we were told that writing was going to be replaced 
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by the radio, the television, and the telephone, and—here we are—writing 
and reading all day long, on our computers, cell phones and smart phones, 
which combine the functions of computers and phones. This prophecy has 
been followed by many other prophecies. For instance, that computers would 
have been literally eaten alive by television (do you remember when they 
told us to use the TV screen as the screen of our computers?), when precisely 
the opposite happened. Or, that paper would have disappeared from our ta-
bles, whereas it is precisely the possibility to write without paper has multi-
plied the quantity of paper with which we have to deal with in our everyday 
life, from undesired advertisements to free newspapers and bargain books. 
And the prophecy according to which the postmodern world, the world of 
information, would have been immaterial, while obsolete plastic and silica 
contribute to a great extent to the worsening of the trash emergency. 
All these wrong predictions are somehow suspect. We’d better acknowl-
edge an essential continuity in the phantasmagoria of technological trans-
formations: what we are confronted with is the spreading—with or without 
paper—of something older than Pyramids, namely writing, which is, and 
has been, the genuine vehicle of globalization, more than jet planes.  How is 
it possible?  How is it possible that all the current technology is essentially 
designed for the function of writing, i.e. recording? How is it possible (an-
other not so implausible prophecy) that the control of energetic resources is 
something less valuable, from a political point of view, than the control of 
memory? In order to answer these questions it is not enough, I believe, to 
make appeal to the power of technique. Because, even if it is true that tech-
nique engenders needs, technique also addresses existing needs that some-
times may be unexpressed, just like in the case of the explosion of writing: 
no one, neither computer makers and phone makers, could have imagined 
what happened next. This means that what took place, somehow surprising 
us all, has to do with the very foundations of social reality. 
Communication
Even if this is true, one might wonder whether there is something wrong, 
or at least exaggerated, in the two main presuppositions that has been at the 
core of the reﬂection on the nature of the society of the past century, namely 
that our society is a society of communication, and that the more synchron-
ic is communication the more effective it is (I speak, you listen, then you 
speak), that is to say that perfection in communication, as Plato already had 
it (the ﬁrst philosopher to condemn writing), can be achieved by means of 
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orality.
On what was based the idea that modern times, more than any other times, 
are characterized by an explosion of communication (idea that has given 
rise to a great number of studies, disciplines, academic programs, devoted 
to communication, which were simply unthinkable and nonexistent before 
the twentieth century)? Here’s my answer. The idea behind the creation of 
something like a science of communication, or theories of information etc., 
is almost certainly the upshot of the introduction and impact of tools such 
as the radio (and its role in the great dictatorships of the Thirties and then 
in Second World War), the ﬁrst television broadcastings (which were not 
recorded), and telephones in every house. This system of communication 
was the last mark of modernity. But if this is true, why there has been such 
a huge comeback of writing? One could say that writing is already present 
in communication, for instance in newspapers. But we know that in the dis-
course about communication newspapers were thought of as a fragile crea-
ture, threatened by television, a creature that was destined to disappear. Also 
in this case, the opposite has happened. Television shows have web sites 
and can be seen off line. Moreover, we can read newspapers on computer 
screens, we can visit a radio or TV web site, and access the inﬁnite video 
resources of You Tube. 
The reﬂections on the science of communication go hand in hand with 
the ideal of dialogue, and the ideal of communicative transparence1. The 
basic idea was that the task of philosophy was that of analyzing language 
and of enabling dialogue, the fundamental rationale of humanity. But things 
went in a different way. On the one hand, the linguistic turn has ceased to 
be the crucial topic of philosophy (be it analytical or continental); on the 
other hand, no one talks about communicative transparence anymore, and 
this is not because human beings are evil, but simply because it couldn’t be 
achieved. Information doesn’t look for, and doesn’t need, transparence; and 
dialogue is a utopia that even its advocates do not practice. What happened 
instead is the triumph of control, of the tracking of every single informa-
tion—ranging from our purchases on the web or in a supermarket to emails 
and phone calls— that increases the possibility of control.
Recording
The crucial point then is that what evidently prevails is not communica-
tion, but, so to say, its possibility condition, namely recording. In such a 
phenomenon there is, somehow, a return to the origin, or better, a return to 
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the essence. The ﬁrst forms of writing were not intended for communication, 
but for the recording of debts and credits, nothing but a means to overcome 
the ﬁnitude of individual memory. 
But isn’t this use of writing what has made its powerful come back in 
the last thirty years? Since 1981 (ﬁrst pc), we have assisted to what I have 
already deﬁned as an explosion of writing, and such an explosion is far from 
being accidental. Mainly because what characterizes it is not writing as com-
munication, but writing as recording; and precisely these kinds of phenom-
ena made something like globalization possible, which in turn is nothing but 
the possibility of overcoming the limits of synchronic communication and of 
transferring packs of recorded data, ranging from ﬁnancial to personal data, 
from one part of the world to the other, thus transforming the orbe in urbe. 
With the telephone this wouldn’t have been possible, just like it wouldn’t 
have been possible to make agreements and sign contracts (that is to say to 
create social objects) without the parts involved in such contracts and agree-
ments being physically present.
We’d better start from this consideration. Human beings are animals that 
communicate. But there wouldn’t be any communication without record-
ing: would a communication between amnesiacs have any sense? Our task, 
at this point, is that of not taking recording for granted, in order to detect its 
real features—a task that is form from being trivial. Communication is such 
a massive phenomenon that its possibility condition and its purpose (as I just 
said without the memory of what is communicated, without recording, there 
would be no communication, it would amount to talking past one another) 
are put in the background (without recording in our head we wouldn’t have 
nothing to communicate). Indeed there are three basic reasons behind the 
priority of recording on  communication. 
Firstly, recording intervenes in ﬁxing the subject of communication. In 
fact, there are at least two good reasons for not communicating: having noth-
ing to say, and not remembering what one wanted to say. As to their practi-
cal consequences, these two circumstances are equivalent, and this is why 
philosophers, from Plato to Husserl, have always stressed the necessity of 
ﬁxating the contents as the basis of knowledge, and, after that, for communi-
cation. However, even if we don’t consider hyperbolic scenarios like the one 
involving amnesiac speakers, it is enough to consider a messer speaker, who 
cannot focus on the content of her communications, muddling and confus-
ing herself, and forgetting what she has to say. Almost certainly, her defects 
would be perceived as defects in communication, but at their basis there 
would be defects in recording. 
Secondly let us imagine that someone communicates with us with a non-
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ﬁxated code, for instance by mixing different languages in a casual way; 
very few things would be understandable. Or let us imagine that someone 
wanted to communicate with us by means of a private language, namely a 
language whose code nobody possesses, neither the speaker of such a lan-
guage. We wouldn’t understand anything, precisely like in the case of the 
messer speaker. And also in such a scenario we would deal with something 
that looks like, at least superﬁcially, a defect in communication whereas the 
defect in question is one that concerns recording, in particular that very im-
portant kind of recording that is codiﬁcation. Finally, let’s imagine to be in 
a conversation with someone and to formulate clear and distinct ideas in a 
perfectly ﬁxed code. The other speaker, however, has taken a medicine that 
prevents her to record segments of speech longer than a few words. When 
I will be ending my utterance, the other speaker will have already forgotten 
its initial part and when my utterance will be complete, she will remember 
(for a very short time) only the last two words. No doubt that such a speaker 
(who completely ignores to be under the effect of a medicine, and even if she 
were told so she would have forgotten it immediately) would believe that 
it is me who talks in a very confusing way, and that it is me having serious 
defects of communication, whereas the truth is that it is her having serious 
problems in recording.
A ﬁrst conclusion can be drawn from this simple thought experiment. By 
examining the classic model of communication2, it’s easy to see that there are 
elements in it that belong to recording. In other terms, only the function of 
contact, i.e. addressing someone, cannot be translated in terms of recording.
Code
Addresser    Message   Addressee
Contact
Context
   
Recording
Recording    Recording   Recording
Contact
Recording
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Inscription 
At this point, one can legitimately object that even if recording is impor-
tant, what really matters is that what is recorded can manifest itself. In other 
words, aren’t records that are hidden in our heads completely useless? Of 
course, but, ﬁrst of all, a record isn’t necessarily hidden in our heads. My 
shopping list is undoubtedly a record (since I didn’t intend to communicate 
what it’s written on it to someone else and it’s highly dubious that I intended 
to “communicate” its content to myself), but it’s certainly not hidden in my 
head. Moreover, it can be read by someone else, but if the person who reads 
it treated the list as a form of communication he or she would be quite bi-
zarre and somehow indiscreet (unless this person is affected by one of those 
pathologies that makes people think that everything talks to them, including 
laundry receipts and unknown people’s shopping lists). 
What I have called elsewhere3 “inscription in technical sense” is a kind 
of record that is, at least in principle, accessible to others but isn’t neces-
sarily destined to become communication, and I believe this is the answer 
to the objection according to which records are nothing if they aren’t com-
municated. If I ask the time to someone and he or she answers, we have a 
communication. But if I read the time of an ATM transaction on a receipt 
can we really say that this is communication? There’s a crucial difference, I 
believe.
Recording not only is at the foundation of what we call “communica-
tion”, but, contrary to the appearances, is at the very foundation of our social 
life. To illustrate this point, I propose two simple experiments: 1. Keep all 
the tickets and pieces of paper collected in one day; 2. Do the same in a one-
week journey. The quantity of paper collected would be very telling: a net-
work of rights, obligations, possibilities, institutions and payments, that are 
encapsulated in documents, be they solemn documents such as the Magna 
Charta or more ordinary documents like parking cards, that nowadays are 
made of plastic. As I have argued elsewhere, the constitutive rule of so-
cial objects is Object = Inscribed Act: social objects are constituted by the 
records of acts that involve at least two persons and that are characterized by 
the fact of being inscribed in some physical support, ranging from marble to 
neurons, from computers to paper, of course.  
To summarize: if our biological life depends on Dna, our social life de-
pends on another code: writing, whose function is to record, with or without 
paper, our social acts. This is why our future, even in the more extraordinary 
scenarios, will always require writing. Because many of the actions we do in 
our everyday life are social acts and such acts always leave a trace, be it the 
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list of telephone companies that tracks our calls or the restaurant receipt, the 
train ticket or the taxi receipt, the sent mail or the received one. 
Imitation
If the hypothesis I am following can be accepted, the notion of inscrip-
tion, which is a public, ordinary thing—something before everyone’s eyes—
could take the place of two rather esoteric notions that have been widely 
discussed over the last years: the nemes and collective intentionality. 
Let us begin with nemes. Roughly thirty years ago4, social sciences have 
started to be interested in the notion of “meme”: an information unit that can 
be replicated by a mind or some other support, and which constitutes the 
equivalent of the gene for the genetics. The underlying idea is that a neme 
encodes information, and it can be transmitted by imitation. Now, the bio-
logical metaphor, according to me, is not of any help, and neither is the idea 
of dealing with minimal units. From this point of view, appealing to inscrip-
tions, which are things everybody knows about, has the same explanatory 
advantage as appealing to memes, without endorsing an almost science ﬁc-
tional route. There are plenty of inscriptions in the world, and—metaphori-
cally speaking—there are styles that remain impressed: behaviors, memo-
ries. This is how culture comes about, and—more speciﬁcally—how social 
objects come into existence, without thereby evoking esoteric entities.
Inscriptions—both in a proper and a metaphorical sense (i.e. styles and 
the like, as above I hinted at)—are transmitted by imitation (viz. through one 
of the most typical performance of writing: iteration) and this is all what it 
takes to constitute a minimal social structure. It seems to me that here we 
have a very important intuition concerning society: society actually comes 
about by imitation, and by iteration of behaviors (and this is a further proof 
of the fact that recording is more important than communicating). Now, let 
us consider this attentively. If it is possible to explain the whole formation 
of social reality on the grounds of a imitation-iteration system—what in-
scriptions ensure—then we meet both the demands of common sense (which 
knows basically everything about social reality—think at envy, which is a 
form of imitation: this is what investments in advertising are based on), and 
those of philosophical and sociological reﬂection5. Moreover, after having 
dismissed an obscure notion, we would be in a position to explain the whole 
social reality without appealing to another notion—which is not less obscure 
that the former: the notion of “collective intentionality”.
Allegedly, collective intentionality6 is a weird kind of “social glue”. It is 
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what allows hyenas to cooperate in hunting a lion, and us all to consider a 10 
euros bill as possessing a value of 10 euros. Such a glue is not just peculiar, 
but it is mysterious too7. Now, it seems to me much simpler to ground society 
on imitation, and imitation on writing. In order to back up such a thesis think 
at what I have just said concerning imitation, and then consider the following 
counter-argument against collective intentionality: if really the glue of social 
reality is collective intentionality, what do we need documents for? Should 
we simply consider them memos of collective intentional states? This would 
be nonsense. If collective intentionality can do and undo basically every-
thing at its own will—as in a sort of permanent revolution—why should we 
ﬁx some if its states, which are doomed to be overcome anyway (I wonder 
what Searle would think about the Trotzkist outcomes of his theory!).
If things are not that way and we indeed need documents, how can be 
maintained that everything depends on collective intentionality? Let me give 
an example, in order to be clear. In The Untergang there is a scene, after the 
Berlin battle, in April 1945, in which the last German defenders are enclosed 
in a fortiﬁed area, they are determined not to give up till the very end, and 
they clearly share with the collective intention “we are in war and we will 
stand united till the end”. At a certain point, the Russian soldiers arrive. For 
a long while everybody hesitate, then a German soldier drop the riﬂe off, 
and one after another they follow him and do the same. They all give up, and 
undoubtedly (since they are a group) at a certain point they have thought 
“we give up”. However, the ﬁrst one has surely thought “I give up”. More 
importantly, the fact that everybody eventually gave up has not brought the 
war to an end. To be sure, the war ended only after that the resigning, ﬁrst of 
the troops of the Berlin Square, then of all further German troops, has been 
signed. Therefore, what determined the social object “peace” has not been 
collective intentionality, but a series of inscriptions.
A last remark concerning collective intentionality. Recently, the so called 
“mirror neurons” have been discovered and studied. These are neurons that 
ﬁres both when a animal (a chimp) makes certain movements for a certain 
aim, and when it observes those very movements in the researcher or in an 
another animal8. The idea was to ﬁnd in these neurons the biological base for 
collective intentionality. My point is whether it would not be more sensible 
to take them, more simply, as the base of imitation. Actually, there is no rea-
son to think that something more complex is going on here, and it would be 
an exaggeration to put the whole burden of social reality and its construction 
on a kind of neurons. According to the hypothesis that I am putting forth 
here, the “imitation system” is based on mirror neurons, and this would not 
rule out that a related “inscription system” might be explained by a base 
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of “reading neurons”9, and by the evolutions of the forms of inscriptions, 
along with bureaucracy and cultural systems—that is the normal equipment 
through which we both explain the social world, and we act in it.
Power
Let me sum up what I have done so far, before going to the most salient 
points of the paper. Actuality is characterized by an explosion of writing and 
recording with respect to which an explanation in term of “communication” 
looks like underdetermined. However, if we look at recording and inscrip-
tion (as the public dimension of recording) in so far as they are constitutive 
elements of social reality, we are in a position to account for the reason why 
writing is so predominant, and therefore we have an explanation of the actu-
ality we are in. And we can do that without appealing to weird entities, but 
only to common sense ingredients, which can show us how the social world 
is based on the rules of imitation and relies heavily on inscriptions of acts, up 
to the creation of a class of bureaucracts and the like, who after all are much 
more visible entities, and have roles and functions in a much more clear way 
than memes and collective intentionality.
Now, I would like brieﬂy to explain in which way the theory of inscrip-
tion I am presenting here can explain not only the construction of social real-
ity, but also, more speciﬁcally, the genesis of the institutional reality—that is 
to say, of power. How is that possible that certain inscriptions can generate 
other inscriptions, and also to endow them with a value? In other words, 
how come that a document makes myself a professor and authorizes me to 
hold exams, which is what other people needs to get a degree, which in turn 
is what will authorize them to perform certain functions? How is that pos-
sible, and a fortiori, that a document authorizes the Bank of Italy to emit 
banknotes that may be used all over Europe and that, in case, can be used to 
generate other documents, for instance by buying stamps. I will explain this 
possibility on the ground of two elements, tradition and securitization.
I start with tradition. Both philosophy10 and common sense have always 
known the value of tradition, which guides our judgments through our prej-
udices, confers authority to practices which have been preserved through 
generations, and so on. Now, it would not be possible for a tradition to be 
there, if it were not possible for recordings to be the case—be it in a oral 
form, as in the poems and rites of societies that do not have writing, or be 
it in laws and documents, which often transfer the “holy” power of tradi-
tion (of “unwritten laws” in a more mundane space, that of beaurocracy, 
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which—on the other hand, and as Kafka teaches us—is not less powerful 
that the traditional space. The clerks who are supposed to give us the forms 
to ﬁll in manifest, through their rudeness, a power that is similar to that of 
the sorcerers11. Even in beaurocratic societies, we see a survival of tradi-
tional authorities, for instance in the etiquette’s rules. Those are institutional 
non-written laws, which have been written only on behalf of the uneducated, 
who are uneducated precisely because they need to read the etiquette’s rules. 
Beside laws that must not be written (as the etiquette’s rules), there are secret 
societies whose laws cannot be written (although if we could we would do 
it, and often, very carefully, indeed we do it). Usually such associations have 
complex rituals (masonry initiations, maﬁa code, etc.) that hold the place of 
writing. In any case, etiquette and secret societies are exceptions to the rule 
of “beaurocratization”. Rather, they show how the development of a tradi-
tion of written laws is the most common outcome of he construction and 
distribution of power in modern societies.
 Let us come now to the role of securitization, which I intend not just in 
the economic sense  (e.g. as applied to illiquid assets), but in a wider sense, 
with reference to the possibility of ﬁxing through writing values, activities, 
titles, appointments, goods. Here, by generalizing an hypothesis concerning 
the birth of the capital12, my hypothesis is that the possibility of writing is 
at the base of the construction not just of the capital, but also every form of 
power, which not by chance is always backed up by systems of distinction, 
classiﬁcations, hierarchies, and archives13.
 
This fact, strictly speaking, is not merely a development of the idea that a 
society without a memory cannot be conceived, but it encompasses a further 
element, the nexus between recording and power. On the one hand, there is 
no power if there is not an inscription that establishes it—either a document 
in our pocket, an academic toga, a military degree, or a sachem hat. On the 
other hand, in the social world the recording of sensorial data is obviously 
a source of power: indeed, one can acquire power even simply by possess-
ing certain recordings (think at telephone companies), or by recording what 
the costumers of a supermarket buy, or more simply by having an addresses 
list. In many cases there is a privacy legislation that, at least in principle, 
protect such recordings, and this is quite telling about the power that they 
confer to whom possesses them (and it is not by chance that such recordings 
are usually property of the State, namely the entity that, in modern societies, 
embodies legitimate power).
A last observation on this. An argument e contrario on the role of inscrip-
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tion in the constitution of power my come exactly from what certain philoso-
phers call the “bare life”14, i.e. life without rights, life reduced to its biology. 
It is not by chance that such a life is called “bare”, namely without inscrip-
tions, either documents or cloths, mobile numbers, or credit cards. Such life 
is described as void of any power, liable to anyone; and it is not difﬁcult to 
believe it, if we think at the poor sans papiers15, or to the inmates of Lagers. 
Now, it is not difﬁcult to notice that the level of lack of power is inversely 
proportional to the number of inscriptions which a subject has at his or her 
disposal. The poor has no money, but has an identity, and thereby—at least 
in principle—has rights; the sans papiers has no documents, but usually has 
a mobile, or certain documents whose validity is disputed; at the lower level 
of the pyramid, void of any rights and powers, there is the Lager inmate.  I 
take this to be a good example to show how power depends on inscriptions.
Difference 
I must now explain why recording is so powerful as I depict it. The un-
derlying idea is that mere communication has not social import, if it is not 
recorded. If someone communicates to me something, and I immediately 
forget what I have been told, all I can do is to ask to repeat what they have 
just said, and be more attentive, or (in case the object of communication is 
not easy to remember, let us say a telephone number or an address) get a pen 
and a piece of paper. Communication alone is worthless, and what I have 
said about information holds true (a fortiori) of an order or a promise, not 
to mention of a performative, that would be completely meaningless if the 
element of recording were not present in communication.
 Still, we ask how is all that possible. Let me come back to globaliza-
tion, and elaborate on it. As a matter of fact, for a long time I have asked 
myself why, in a famous book16, Derrida has coupled writing and difference, 
and I have always found cryptic and difﬁcult to grasp all his talk about dif-
férance17.  However, precisely the example of globalization (and all what 
contains) can make much apparent, even trivial, the link between the two, 
and make concretely understandable  the notion of différance, which I will 
simply call “difference”—keeping in mind that such a word does not refer 
only to difference, but also to the act of differing, or referring.
I claimed before that what makes globalization possible is not the fact 
that goods and commodities travels, or that people at different places can 
communicate, but writing as a form of recording. Consider these three situ-
ations.
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(1)  A  Travel  B
 
This is the model of physical transport, which has always been there, and 
that thus cannot be what has produced globalization. If in A something from 
B arrives, or if you move from A to B, either way you are localized, not glo-
balized.
(2)  A  TV, telephone  B
You are in A and see B, or you speak with B. But at a certain moment, be-
cause of the time zones, you have to choose: either you are in A or in B. And 
indeed you stay in A.
(3)  A  Web  B
Through fast writing (web) you are in A and in B at the same time, thanks to 
a difference (postponing) that inscriptions make possible. 
Model (3)—the model of globalization through writing—allows us to 
overcome the problem of the time zones, it transmits recordings that are 
already stored in a compact way, and is the fastest and the most proliﬁc—
compared to all others. How is that possible? Indeed, we realize that the pos-
sibility of differing, of postponing, of avoiding the synchrony of exchanges 
is the base not only of globalization, but of every kind of society. And this 
demonstrates that globalization is not an accident, but what society, since 
humanity dwelled the caves, was bound to.
Notes
1. Habermas 1981.
2. Jakobson 1963.
3. Ferraris 2007.
4. Dawkins 1976.
5. E.g. the reﬂections by Gabriel Tarde on the “laws of imitation” (Tarde 1890)
6. Searle 1995, Tuomela 1995 e 2002.
7. I have discussed collective intentionality in Ferraris 2005, and in 
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8. Gallese 2003.
9. Dehaene 2007.
10. Gadamer 1960.
11. I owe to Giuliano Torrengo the following comment: “Beaurocracy in India is indeed 
massive (every “ofﬁcial” action requires a lot of forms and documents, and genera-
tes as many of them). The beaurocrats (who are 10% of the population, sometimes 
including whole families) have really power, since by delaying or denying to you 
even just a step of the usually long course, they literally can get you stuck for days 
(and imagine if you need to reserve a train for the day after...). From this it follows 
a weird mix of reverence and hate by the non-beaurocrats, and also a sort of “sub-
mission” behavioral code—whose only purpose is to make the whole beaurocratic 
machinery work. The basic rules are: do not get the beaurocrat nervous, you won’t 
get anything done, always claim that their are right, apologize all the time, etc.”
12. De Soto 2000.
13. Bourdieu 1979.
14. Agamben 1995 (the expression is by Walter Benjamin).
15. Ferraris 2007.
16. Derrida 1967b.
17. Derrida 1968.
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